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THE LABILITIES OF LLBERALISM AND NATIONALISM AFTER COMMUNISM: 
POLISH BUSINESSMEN IN THE ARTICULATION OF THE NATION' 
Michael D. Kennedy 
Liberalism and nationalism have been juxtaposed as fundamental alternatives in defining 
postcommunism's course. Liberals are individualist, not collectivist. They should favor pluralism, tolerance and 
the market economy. Nationalists are collectivist. They should favor statist if not dictatorial solutions to social 
conflict and economic issues. I think this admittedly simplified but too frequent opposition is-a problematic point of 
departure for analysis. Instead of assuming ideological difference, I propose we reconsider the labilities of 
liberalism and nati~nalism.~ I suggest we focus on the unstable relationship both between liberalism and 
nationalism, as well as the instability within these broad ideological formations. In this essay, I elaborate such a 
theory of ideological lability and develop that approach for studying East European liberals and Polish 
businessmen in the articulation of the nation. 
I begin the essay by considering how lability is worked out of liberalism and nationalism. 
Analysts tend to stabilize these visions by focusing on the articulations of liberal collectivities and more collective 
nations by their principal spokespersons. This method implicitly reinforces the categorical distinctions between 
positions. Instead, I propose that we undertake an alternative method in which these labilities are more filly 
evident. 
One of the most important starting points for this alternative method is to treat the articulation of . 
liberalism as critically as postcommunist studies treat nationalism. Drawing on Jerzy Szacki's volume, I describe 
some of liberalism's instabilities in Polish practice. I turn next to the national formation of the postcommunist 
liberal subject.' I consider the conditions under which the liberal spokesperson articulates the nation, and what 
formulations of the nation dominate that liberal elaboration. 
Labilities are more apparent, however, when one switches from ideological enuncations to everyday life, 
to the presence of these ideological formations in practice.3 This approach has certainly been common enough for 
social histories, but I believe that we should extend it to intellectuals themsel~es.~ The everyday life of intellectuals 
should be as much an object of our analysis as their more public identities. Once we shift our gaze to everyday life, 
the distinction of intellectuals from non-intellectuals becomes more difficult to render, however. We are more 
likely, then, to identify other types of actors as intellectuals in function if not in nomenclature. 
~usinessmen' are not traditionally defined as 'intellectuals' in Eastern Europe or in the West. I am not 
suggesting that Polish businessmen are intellectuals in any familiar sense of the term. Rather, intellectuals and the 
businessmen I analyze in this essay are a subset of a larger category of social actors called "prominenci."6 
Prominenci are those who appear to play a disproportionate role in shaping public opinion, and as a consequence, 
the articulation of the nation. Polish intellectuals have played that role traditionally,' but in postcommunist times, 
they are "retiring from the stage."' With that exit, Polish businessmen become important new voices in the public 
sphere and in everyday life. Their "rational" and "sophisticated business practices not only facilitate profit 
making and European multinational integration, but those practices are also innovative cultural products with 
public consequence. I suggest that they are transforming the meaning of the Polish nation by extending the 
principles associated with their business practice to the rearticulation of the nation. 
The explicit innovativeness of articulation varies, however, and becomes more pronounced when 
liberalism's contradictions are more apparent and when the nation's ideological formations intersect with business 
practice or other putatively liberal spaces. Polish businessmen and women employed in multinational corporations 
are especially likely to find working conditions conducive to the articulation of a new kind of national liberalism. 
In this essay, I explore how a few Polish businessmen and women negotiate the contradictions between a necessary 
nationalism and an ideologically powerful liberalism and in the process generate a new ideological formation for 
Polish postcommunist capitalism. 
In this essay, I do not demonstrate that businessmen have replaced intellectuals in Poland's public sphere. 
I also do not prove that Polish businessmen are at the center of a new national ideology with business at its core. 
My primary data -- forty four indepth interviews with businessmen and women who are themselves involved in 
multinational business ventures -- do not allow that kind of analysis. Instead, I draw upon those interviews to 
suggest how Polish businessmen are rearticulating the meaning of the nation. Before I turn to that more specific 
reformulation, I begin with an account of labilities. 
THE LABILITIES OF NATIONALISM AND LIBERALISM 
Both liberalism and nationalism are typically studied in their more 'fixed' ideological formations. 
Focusing on postc.ommunist Eastern Europe magnifies this tendency. 
Analysts typically distinguish nationalisms with reference to its 'type,' pronounced by its adjective. They 
stabilize the elusive phenomenon by distinguishing among political and ethnic nationalisms, official and 
revolutionary nationalisms, or with other categorical differences. This categorical reference begins beyond 
contexts and typically descends upon a particular set of rhetorics and practices. Oficial proclamations or symbolic 
texts, or their carriers -- states or social movements -- illustrate that nationalism's qualities. As nationalism 
becomes the new 'threat,' Western states and international organizations work with indigenous liberals to 
emphasize the opposition between liberalism and nationalism. Through this collaboration, nationalism is produced 
as a "dark, elemental, unpredictable force of primordial nature threatening the orderly calm of civilized life."I0 
Thus, liberalism and nationalism become the main ideological contestants in the postcommunist world. 
Nationalisms also contest one another. 
One people's nationalism evokes another, which in turn inspires others. Rogers Brubaker has proposed 
that we move away from comparisons based on dichotomous contests among nations or between a majority nation 
and its minorities. He suggests that we consider the intersection of nationalizing states, national minorities and 
external national homelands as the triadic configuration generating struggles. Brubaker recommends we study 
each position in terms of a 'field' of activity, of "differentiated and competitive positions or stances." This 
rethinking encourages us to review contest within fields as much as between them." I find this elaboration quite 
useful. It certainly invites a conception of nationalism's lability. However, Brubaker's execution pays little heed to 
the ways in whch liberalism is implicated in nationalism or how that implication elevates its lability. This is 
especially evident in Brubaker's application to the Yugoslav War of Succession, in which he fails to consider how 
Slovenia's 'liberalism' helps to explain the beginning of war. l 2  Whatever the application, however, Brubaker's 
approach is certainly open to considering the mutual implication of liberalism and nationalism. 
Liberalism tends to be treated differently than nationalism. Nationalism's ideologists purport to know the 
core of the nation. Liberalism's spokespersons typically contend that their core is procedural, not substantive. The 
activities of a plurality of people who accept common liberal rules for action usually define liberalism's core. In 
this sense, and only if all other things are equal, liberal ideology is closer to everyday life than is nationalism. Its 
substance is multiple, contradictory and variable. This may be one reason why so many East European 
intellectuals wound up counterposing 'life against ideology' during late communism. It is also one reason why 
they are less likely to see liberalism's own ideological power.I3 
In postcommunism, however, liberalism cannot be so fluid. Locked in ideological struggle with 
communist rule and later with varieties of nationalism and socialism, liberals must make liberalism more fixed 
than its ideological project declares ideal. This is especially apparent when its promoters become rulers, and 
attempt to make a liberal economy, if not polity and society. Not only must liberals define the rules of contest, but 
they also must obviously enter the terrain of other ideological formations. Beyond setting trade policies and forms 
of property, they must define the nation. They must declare who are citizens and who are not. They must declare 
the relationship between foreign interests and the national interest. They must establish who may own the land, 
and who may not. Liberalism, thus, becomes more fixed and stabilized as it enters a cultural fray, and moves 
beyond its com~nonsensical foundations in developed capitalist societies. Nationalism and liberalism, especially 
when thus locked in cultural struggle, ought therefore to become more fixed. If we think of ideology as an 
increasingly coherent and consistent culture, produced through contest, liberalism and nationalism become more 
ideological under postcommunist conditions.14 Nationalism and liberalism also become more fixed ideological 
formations as intellectuals become more central to the definition of their project. 
Intellectuals are central to nationalism in two fundamental ways. Firstly, nationalism frequently requires 
the intellectual to articulate what the nation is because its empirical esistence is not what it ought to be. It may be 
"repressed" by foreign domination or "immature" due to economic or social underdevelopment. Nevertheless, that 
empirical existence is essential. Intellectuals depend on that ontology to claim the right to articulate a position 
based on their own personal identity embedded in a broader affinity with a larger collective identity." Thus, 
intellectuals struggle to fix the nation in their own ideology, reconciling the expectation of the nation with its 
current condition. 
Secondly, intellectuals are frequently treated as symbols of the nation's existence. Intellectual historians 
and others who research and write about intellectuals themselves can reproduce those very nationalist aspirations 
that motivate their subjects. They elaboratetheir subject's particular articulation of the nation, and use that very 
intellectual to represent the nation's meaning in social space. By telling individual life stories of prominenci in 
familiar narrative forms, the labilities of the nation are thus fixed. For example, we can know nationalism by 
taking any particular nation's nationalist exemplar, in Poland perhaps Roman Dmowski, and study his life and 
what he has written. One thus can "know" nationalism by representing a nationalist's coherent life and ideas. One 
can make that life even more coherent by emphasizing a particular period of a person's life that fits with the 
ideological vision to be reinforced. Ivan Franko's early years are ideal for those socialist visionaries of Ukraine, 
while national democrats tend to focus on his later years. Few focus on the times and conditions of his mortal 
illness, for that contributes little to fixing the nation. 
Liberalism, however, depends less on intellectuals. Liberalism thrives as an invisible ideology, without 
spokespersons. It does not put intellectuals in such a central position as nationalism does. Liberalism may provide 
a smaller role for intellectuals because liberalism is less collectivist than nationalism. Perhaps it is because one 
needs fewer liberal ideologues than nationalist ones because liberalism should be a less particularist vision that 
needs only interpreters rather than legislators.I6 In postcommunist Eastern Europe, however, liberalism is said to 
oppose both nationalism and socialism. Liberal ideologues and spokespersons are thus necessary to elevate that 
ideological opposition. To focus on the texts of liberal intellectuals is thus as important as to focus on those of 
nationalists. At the same time, by focusing on these intellectuals, liberalism's labilities are also likely to be 
minimized.. 
DISSECTING LIBERALISM 
Nationalism has always been a significant object of inquiry in East European studies, but it has become 
newly important. In the wake of communism's collapse and in lieu of terrorism, nationalism is the next threat. 
Many fewer analysts study liberalism as an ideological formation. Most intellectuals oriented toward the West see 
it as a virtue rather than a liability'and an ally whose dissection could prove troubling. Is it not better to look at the 
threat that makes one's position superior than to consider whether the ideology grounding hope stands on clay 
feet?" Does one want to offer a critique of liberalism that might create a self-fulfilling prophecy, as some of my 
Polish sociological colleagues have cautioned me? Fortunately for us, Jerzy Szacki does not recoil from such 
serious inquiry, and I draw upon his work to offer the following portrait of liberalism's power and tensions.'' 
Many would see liberalism as communism's legitimate successor. Liberalism most decisively departs 
from the principles of communist rule, and at the same time, European liberalism has enjoyed a genuine 
renaissance. Communism's putative antithesis comes at the same time as it enjoys a global heyday. Liberalism's 
variety is more apparent than any particular essence, however, and the partiality of its success and influence is 
more apparent than its final victory. Nevertheless, certain tenets of liberalism are hegemonic in postcommunist 
Poland and the other East Central European countries, even among those former communists who now call 
themselves Social Democrats. While liberal ideologues are likely to identify themselves as the true liberals, and 
others as 'false'lg, much of liberalism has become part of the more general ideological landscape of postcommunist 
Central Europe. 
Szacki cautions that liberalism is not so secure as it appears, however. Postcommunist liberalism shares 
with other democratic market economies that tension between political and economic l ibera~isrn.~~ It also has 
special problems. For instance, liberals should favor a society in which the rights and responsibilities of individuals 
are param~unt .~ '  Such a doctrinaire liberalism seems rather inadequate to the task of rapid economic 
transformation in which quasi-Bolshevik methods of implementing economic change are widely appreciated 
among liberals. Finally, liberalism is not an integral element of national cultures in Eastern Europe. Although 
Polish historiography can place a strong emphasis on the liberal foundations of noblemen's democracy, Szacki is 
rather skeptical about liberalism's fit with the ~olish'nation. While it does look liberal in comparison to Russian 
traditions, it is quite different from contemporary emphases on the centrality of the individual and the importance 
of economic  dimension^.^^ As an alternative, Szacki suggests we consider three types of Polish liberalism. 
One should understand East European communism's democratic opposition as protoliberal. It elevates 
civil society over individualism, and subordinates the latter to various collectivist impulses from 'society' writ 
large. Any community or social movement, indeed Solidarnosc itself, could be the empirical expression of this 
collectivity. This collective society was the agent of social transformation. Solidarnosc, empowered by workers 
and its allied intelligentsia, was the best example. Szacki argues that a more integral liberalism, one that goes 
beyond the justification of capitalism, is underdeveloped in Poland. Indeed, the articulation of views on culture 
and society has remained, among liberals, quite underdeveloped in comparison to their views on economy.23 
Econonlic liberalism followed protoliberalism's development in Poland, emerging after the 1980-81 
Solidarity movement. It rejected both communism and the revolutionary means to fight it. This perspective 
wanted to de-emphasize politics and make economic change central. Before communism's collapse, Miroslaw 
Dzielski and others looked at the second economy as evidence for communism's liberal alternative. Departing 
from Solidarity's vaunting of the working class, this view celebrated the entrepreneur and the middle class. 
Dzielski wrote, "The person who trades is the pillar of civilization, and in conditions of socialism also its heroic 
champion."24 With its simultaneously realist and decentering approach to politics, Szacki identifies three key 
aspects to economic liberalism: "absolute primacy to the economic system .... accepting liberal or neoliberal views 
on the economy in their orthodox form ...( and) recognizing these views not only as necessary but also as a ~ ~ c i e n t  
condition of being a liberal ...."2s 
Although they focus on the economic, liberals also recognize that society itself must change. It is not 
sufficient to change property laws. Indeed, society must rid itself of economic traditionalism and socialist residues. 
Like the organic intellectuals in the end of the 19th century, today's liberals believe that society must learn that 
making money is good for the nation. It must learn that socialism is the enemy to the nation that must 
modernize.26 Liberals developed this point of view before 1989, but when they took power its cultural value 
soared. This societal critique legitimated their attempt to initiate radical systemic change regardless of popular 
wishes and regardless of liberalism's orthodox interpretation. 
Systemic transformation required the rejection of liberal political action. One cannot change a system 
piecemeal. One could not introduce liberalism as a system with many ways of life. It had to acquire that holistic 
approach to change that wvas more characteristic of communism and nationalism: that there is but one way to 
construct a system. This introduced, then, the basic contradiction of the postcommunist liberal project, within its 
own economic formation, as well in relation to its traditional bedfellow, democracy. It had to become, in the words 
of a former Minister of Privatization, a 'pragmatic liberalism,' one that uses the state to shorten the way to the 
market. 
At the same time, that state had to compromise with a society with a 'communist mentality' and preserve 
some of the welfare provisions that would make continued liberal politics po~sible.~' Furthermore, because its 
social base is so small, pragmatic and democratic liberals (as opposed to pure and authoritarian ones) had to find 
ways of combining economic liberalism with other Polish values. Szacki has thus posed the right question: "Do the 
noneconomic postulates of today's Polish liberals refer only to the necessity of rooting out the remnants of real 
socialism from all areas of life, or do they also call for transcending the traditional forms of Polish thinking and 
Polish life?" 28 This is where the labile relationship behveen liberalism and the nation emerges. 
In most circumstances, liberalism and nationalism are posed as opposing principles. In all its varieties, 
nationalism's emphasis on the priority of the nation's collective rights ovenvhelms the individual rights 
emphasized in liberalism. Szacki argues that their common appearance at any moment is more a matter of . 
historical conjuncture and common enemies rather than ideological affinities.29 When communism ceased to be 
the primary enemy, the allies made in anticommunism -- liberals and nationalists -- were opponents again. Those 
who would emphasize Christian values as the primary concern of Polish politics can find in liberalism an enemy, 
one that undermines the truth of God's law with its claims to pluralism.30 Economic liberals do not necessarily 
respond in kind, and rather seek to reconcile Polish and Christian value systems with the new economic 
liberali~m.~' 
Szacki's book, magisterial in its sweep and dedicated in its purpose, nonetheless articulates an implicit 
hope in the generation of a broader liberalism. He sees many barriers to this in Poland. Liberalism does not have 
a clear political ancestry in Poland. Polish identity has, with its stateless existence for 123 years, emphasized 
communitarian values and the centrality of Catholicism. Poland's relative homogeneity means that political 
tolerance does not appear so necessary as in a more explicitly diverse society. The majority understands its 
tolerance as bene~olence .~~ 
Both in his prescriptive conclusion and his historical argument, Szacki identifies both the contradictions 
of liberalism and its exclusions. It is about economic arguments, and it is difficult to extend its implications to 
politics and culture. Liberalism is not, after all, a good theory for radical political and cultural change. Too, the 
religious and the nationalists are hegemonic in the articulation of politics and culture in Poland. In short, the 
liberal theory of politics and culture might be difficult to make effective in postcommunist, and especially Polish, 
conditions. On the other hand, it is quite possible to see the effect of liberalism in culture as everyday life and in 
the articulation of national politics. In particular, one can focus on the formation of the liberal subject, and his 
implication in the nation. 
THE NATIONAL FORMATION OF THE POSTCOMMUNIST LIBERAL SUBJECT 
Szacki elaborates Polish liberalism's dilemmas by focusing on its macrocultural and macrosocial 
contradictions and their expressions in elite pronouncements and political and social conflicts. In this portrait, the 
clash of cultures and the compromises of elites produce the labilities of liberalism and nationalism. Szacki thus 
provides the necessary contextual foundation for those who would develop a sociology that focuses on the choices a 
subject makes among existing alternatives. Szacki does not, however, provide the foundation for considering the 
conditions which allow agents to alter the choices before them. In order for that approach to be developed, one 
must focus as much on theformation of the subject as on that subject's possible choices.33 
A theory of subject formation is especially importailt for understanding the lability of ideological 
formations. Ideological lability is most apparent when actors reconfigure ideological formations in order to address 
particular goals. As Bill Sewell describes it, agency is apparent in "an actor's capacity to reinterpret and mobilize 
an array of resources in terms of cultural schemas other than those that initially constituted the array".34 Sewell 
identifies five factors that might elevate the conditions of this agency: 
1) the multiplicity of structures: any social unit is going to be composed of a variety.of structures which are 
unlikely to be entirely homologous or in synchrony with one another; this variety of structures can lead to 
conflicting claims and social conflicts; 
2) the transposibility of schenras: actors are capable of taking schemas or rules learned in one context and applying 
them to another; 
3) the intersection of structures: structures with different schemas and different resources overlap and interact in 
any given setting, making their smooth reproduction always potentially problematic given the contradictions that 
could emerge from their contact; 
4) unpredictability of resource accumulation: enactments of schemas can produce quite unforeseen outcomes, and 
those outcomes, if saciently altering the power relations in a given social unit, lead to a transformation of 
structure; and 
5) the polysemy of resources: the multiplicity of meaning potentially attached to any set of resources means that 
these resources can be interpreted in different ways, with various consequences for social transformation. 
I find the first three factors especially usehl for developing a theory of the national formation of the 
postcommunist liberal subject. One place to begin is with the empirical elaboration of that theory is with Business 
and the Middle Classes, edited by Jacek Kurczewski and Iwona ~akubowska-~ranicka.~~ 
This collection exemplifies sociological approaches to such a liberal subject. They focus, above all, on its 
articulation as a class actor, a middle class. In this particular collection, they find that the new capitalist middle 
classes ally with socialism's middle classes to construct values that support the development of market society. 
These middle classes apparently value individualism, private property and the prestige of financial success more 
than others in the social structure. The nation, however, appears irrelevant. 
There are some places, of course, where the nation does enter the discourse of liberalism. Iwona Krzesak 
finds that the Business Center Club, 36 arguably the leading business organization in Poland, demands that a BCC 
member be an exemplary citizen. The Club supports the vision of the democratic and competent state based on the 
rule of law. It expects the businessman to be well informed on political, social and economic matters in the 
country. Businessmen, the BCC recommends, should help solve problems and help those weaker than themselves, 
using their superior organizational skills for the benefit of Even in this direct engagement,however, the 
meaning of the nation remains underelaborated. The liberal's nation is a nation where the rule of law enables 
pragmatic well informed citizens to make intelligent choices. The nation, other than as a site of activity, virtually 
disappears. The individual subject reigns supreme. Businessmen, as liberalism's carrier, thus tend not to discuss 
the nation. Their social conditions normally disencourage their explicit articuluation of the nation. Nevertheless, 
their political spokespersons do find themselves in that space where the nation must be articulated. 
Drawing on indepth interviews with parliamentary elites, Elzbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz and 
Wlodzimierz ~ e s o l o w s k i ~ ~  found Polish liberals from both the postcommunist party and post-Solidarity parties 
understanding Europe as a "configuration of civil ~ociet ies ."~~ They suggest that liberals view nations as pluralistic 
sites of interest formation among individuals and groups. Liberals thus tend not to elaborate the nation in 
ideological terms because their own nation should not be peculiar. By contrast, other Polish politicians see Europe 
as threatening on moral grounds. These deputies, typically from the Christian and Peasant parties, see Europe as a 
thr&t to Polish national identity. Europe is debauched, they claim, and Poland retains, or should retain, its 
traditional moral and spiritual values. These nationalists thus tend to construct nations as particular moral 
communities with common interests. In such a framework, the elaboration of national distinction becomes quite 
important. Indeed, it is much more important for the right wing than for the liberals.. 
Nevertheless, liberals take the schemas associated with liberalism and use them to reconceive the meaning 
of nations. As political elites negotiating Poland's relationship to Europe, they are obliged to engage the question 
more seriously than those domestic middle classes with relatively little obligation to define the nation. One might 
surmise that liberals will typically retreat from articulating the nation, given that the liberal point is to de- 
emphasize it. ~a t iona l  political institutions are composed of a variety of structures in which national claims and 
liberal claims must intersect, however. 
Under these conditions, liberal political leaders, distinguished precisely by their claim to national ' 
leadership, must articulate their vision of the nation. The most liberal and cosmopolitan of actors must somehow 
define the nation, even as they promote larger regional and global association. For instance, Czech ~res;dent 
Vaclav Have1 recently recognized that very point:40 
For the first time in the history of mankind, our civilization has become truly global, 
encompassing the entire world. Yet at the same time, perhaps because of its global character, it is 
marked by increasingly determined attempts made by various cultures and regions at preserving 
their distinctiveness., 
This need not mean, however, that this national distinction is a threat or barrier. Liberals are at work trying to 
redefine their own national mission in the contest,of various liberal integrative projects. According to Slovenia's 
Milan ~ u c a n ~ ' ,  for instance, 
It is very important for us within the framework of European integration in the economic area to 
also prove capable of evaluating and intensifying our individuality in the area of culture; in the 
area of spiritual values, and in the area of spiritual forms. The views of the hture can be verified 
only through continuously constructed dialogue. . . . 
In this move, Kucan transposes several familiar liberal schemas: 1) He separates the economic from the 
social and cultural, allowing the nation to develop in the cultural realm while liberalism proceeds apace in the 
economic; 2) He introduces a spirit of dialogue and compromise, one that presumes, like the contract, the ability 
for individually rational agents to come to mutually appealing agreements depending on a willingness to 
compromise and relatively egalitarian conditions of communication. 
These articulations of the 'nation do not imply lability, however. They reflect the liberal and nationalist 
ideological conflict, and the attempt by liberals to articulate a vision of the nation that is compatible with their 
economic priorities. To consider labilities, we should consider the transformations of visions and their associated 
practicies. 
THE LABILE ENGAGEMENT OF LIBERALISM AND NATIONALISM 
Liberals not only articulate the meaning of liberalism or their own vision of the nation. They also 
articulate the meaning of nationalism itself. 
Nationalists and liberals have uneven access to the global media. Outside their relevant diasporas, 
nationalists are more poorly known than liberals and are typically mediated by others. For instance, we know that 
Istvan Csurka is a chauvinist right wing Hungarian, but he is mostly described for us by others who analyze his 
threat.42 By contrast, liberals are more likely to present themselves. Gyorgy Konrad is a liberal, European 
Hungarian, and his works are regularly translated and used to illustrate the progressive hope in Eastern ~ u r o p e . ~ ~  
To publish the nationalist in the global media risks endorsing that vision, something most global medias will not 
risk. Hence, the very form in which liberalism and nationalism are presented in global media reinforces the 
general imagery of liberal definitions looking global, and nationalist ones remaining parochial. The liberal is 
familiar and unmediated. The nationalist must be explained. Vladimir Tismaneanu's work exemplifies this 
normativelanalytical stance. 
Tismaneanu writes a political history of East European transformations around the identification of hope. 
Hope lies in the virtues of civic culture and pluralism. During the transformations of 1989, he writes, "concepts 
like popular sovereignty, European consciousness, civil rights and many others reacquired h l l  semantic 
justification." 44 In this sense, the East European transformations represent not only national liberation, but also 
the promise of a wider emancipatory hope. Nationalism, however, represents the danger. The new threat is 
ethnocracy. 
Elsewhere, ~ ismaneanu~ '  identifies the basic crisis of postcommunist society to rest in the uncertainty, 
insecurity, fear and helplessness characteristic of the change.. Radical nationalism, he argues, provides the 'myth' 
which provides "consolation, the bliss of community, a simple way to overcome feelings of humiliation and 
inferiority and a response to real or imaginary threats".46 What is more, this is building on the political culture of 
intolerance and self righteousness characteristic of coinmunism itself. It is used by old communists to preserve 
their position, but builds upon the unresolved psychological and historical problems of each nation. 
In these analyticaYnormative approaches to the nation, the analysis secures a place from which the nation 
is simultaneously understood and critiqued. The universal andlor global position afforded by the discourse of 
human rights or civil society allows the critique of any particular nationalist. Indeed, the general opposition 
between liberalism and nationalism can be secured by i d e n w n g  the proper historical and social structural 
explanations for the particularly labeled nationalism now revived in communism's wake. Implicit in this account, 
of course, is that there is an alternative. 
Lability can rests not only in altering nationalism's meaning or transforming the meaning of the nation 
through liberal ideology. Lability also can rest in the transformation of the field in which nationalism is 
understood. By focusing our intellectual energies on explaining the deviant formation of nationalism, we imply 
that there ought, if not could, be an alternative. To the extent that alternative remains unspoken,or embedded in 
more universalistic hopes of liberalism's virtue, nationalism, through globalization, becomes ever more deviant. 
And as we multiply adjectives to define the latest nationalist deviation, we embed that innovation in a tradition of 
nationalism rather than implicate it' in liberalism itself. In short, I suggest that explanations of nationalism are 
problematic to the extent they focus primarily on nationalists themselves. Lability ought to make us more aware of 
how liberalism structures the explanation of nationalism, even when liberals are hardly evident in that nation. 
Of course nationalists are not likely to allow the liberal vision to pass unmarked, but this varies by society. 
As Katherine Verdery emphasizes in this collection, liberalism in the Romanian context has a much more difficult 
time than liberalism in the Hungarian or Polish. To be 'liberal' in the Romanian context risks not just association 
with being European, but also with being Hungarian. And to be overly sympathetic to Hungarian discourse might 
suggest that one sympathizes with that nation, in the Romanian nationalist discourse, that threatens Romanian 
territorial integrity most. Polish liberals, however, can claim that their Westward gaze is simply recognizing a 
geopolitical choice that Poles must make.47 Alliance with the West may be the best way to preserve their national 
independence before a potential Russian threat. 
Regardless of nationalist dynamics, the liberal articulation of the nationalist threat and liberal alternative 
is more effective when it comes from within the nation. National liberals not only indicate the possibility of an 
indigneous liberalism, but they also provide an example of what it means to be liberal in that context. The liberal 
thus becomes embodied and signified as a living alternative to the nationalist threat, and the 'opposition' between 
liberal and nationalist is preserved. By recognizing the particular rhetorical move underlying this opposition, 
however, lability becomes apparent. Without the national liberal in residence, liberalism could never transcend the 
claim that its opposition to nationalism is based on its own hidden nationalism. 
National liberals are also developing their own form of nationalism, however. They are moving beyond 
the normal civil society model of the nation that I described earlier. For political reasons, however, this meaning 
of the nation is better left underelaborated. 
Liberals give primacy to the economic system. To the extent they also accept liberal or neoliberal views 
on the economy in their orthodox form4' they are also, of necessity, oriented toward a global economy. There is no 
alternative, in this framework, to reconstructing national economies in order to 'fit' with the West. This is a 
position of liberals in either global or indigenous space. 49 In this very moment of articulation, however, liberals 
argue that the nation is inadequate, and that economic salvation rests without.50 Thus, even those liberals who 
would prefer to avoid the multinational question are somehow implicated in a debate about the relative merits of 
the nation. And when it comes to economic questions, the nation typically does not fare well before liberals. One 
of the best illustrations of that can be found in the obse~ations of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Poland's most liberal 
Prime ~in is te r . "  
Drawing on his own experience as a director of the consulting firm, Doradca, Bielecki emphasizes hls 
pragmatic orientation. While Bielecki considers his party strongly rooted in a faith around certain ideals5* with a 
very Western grounding,53 it is based more on reason and common sense rather than ideology. He could develop a 
clear program, "with our own definition of privati~ation,"~~ based on these ideals and cbmmon sense. In order to 
have this program, however, these ideals depend on a very clear ideology of what is healthy and normil in the 
world system, and what is aberrant. This liberal ideology allow s liberals to look at their own society, their own 
national identity, with an extremely critical eye, enabling a kind of distance from Polishness itself. For instance, 
Bielecki says this of Polish culture ... 
It is for sure difficult to be a boss in Poland. ... Poles don't like bosses. In general, Poles don't do 
well in the position of being a boss, and in my opinion, it is even impossible. We are not a 
society that has a genetic in built formal discipline.55 ... in Poland, it is not believed that success 
is a result of work, knowledge and exceptional know-how, but a result of a dirty deaLs6 
Bielecki also criticizes society in general for the corruption that he had to deal with as Prime Minister. For 
instance, he asks why so many bank cashiers did not concern themselves with these obviously suspicious checks in 
the famous Art-B scandal. He uses this as evidence of Poles' lack of responsibility, especially in comparison to 
what would happen in ~ngland." 
Such a liberal critique of the Polish nation would be perfect fodder for nationalist counter-mobilization if 
it were mounted from London or New York alone. In this case, howvever, liberalism comes from within the Polish 
nation. In that moment, liberalism offers its rebuttal to nationalism. Liberal ideology enables Bielecki to step 
outside of his "Polishness" to administer the treatment that might cure his nation of its socialist malady." At the 
same time, because he administered it, he could claim implicitly that he has transcended the problem. And because 
he is a Pole, the Polish nation, embodied in Bielecki, can become what it is not yet. This implicit liberal rebuttal to 
the nationalist charge therefore relies on the same nationalist lability identified earlier. The liberal intellectual 
must be of the nation to make the critique. Proof of that liberal's critique rests in the power of the national 
ideology, however. If one Pole can do it, all Poles might potentially make it. Liberalism thus enters the nation as 
an alternative nationalism that claims to be apart from nationalism. Liberalism gains its transformative power by 
becoming national. Its power also rests on its ability to transcend the national. This is lability. 
These two engagements of liberalism and nationalism - the liberal critique of the actually existing nation 
and the liberal critique of the actually existing nationalist -- are both national expressions. Without grounding 
within the nation, the liberal critique cannot escape the nationalist counters. Thus, liberalism must become 
national in order to become effective, and must accept the national claim that national identity matters. Liberalism 
and nationalism might be distinguished by their relative emphasis on individualism and collectivism in ideological 
terms, but liberalism requires its own nationalism in order to be effective. The labilities of liberalism and 
nationalism remain, however, underdeveloped precisely because we remain grounded in the liberal intellectual's 
articulation of the nation. 
INTELLECTUALS AND THE NATION IN POLISH BUSINESS 
Ideology, by its very contestable nature, is designed to be more packaged, more coherent on a manifest 
level. Ideological critique might find the labilities, as suggested above, but t h s  is likely to be the work of 
intellectuals rather than ideologues. Labilities do not only live in deconstructionist lairs, however. Lability is more 
apparent in everyday life than in the study of elites or ideological expressions. It is more apparent because 
everyday life typically doesn't encourage the formulation of coherent packages of world views. Elites and masses 
have very different levels of coherence in their belief systems.59 One might even question whether categories of 
actors ought to be transformed in the study of the everyday. Businessmen are not after all, familiar intellectuals in 
the articulation of the nation. 
They are not familiar first of all because they typically don't enunciate the nation. Indeed, as we have 
explored above, liberalism itself shies away from elaborating that nation because it has relatively little to say, in 
comparison to nationalists, and what it does have to say is not an elevation of that nation as it already exists. 
Given the importance, however, of the international qualities of economic reform, however, Polish business is 
deeply implicated in the nation's redefinition. Businessmen are also not familiar in this role of articulating nations 
because they are not typically regarded as intellectuals. Under postcommunist conditions, however, I believe they 
should be, for two basic reasons. 
Firstly, on one empirical level, leading businessmen like io cultivate an image of intellectual 
accomplishment, a certain Bildung. For instance, Gazeta Wvborcza published a Dictionary of Polish Businessmen 
on May 12, 1993~'. In this collection of 130 men'and 20 women, 68% had higher education, and 17 out of 20 
women had this education (in comparison to 7% of the general population). Of those with higher education, 40% 
had degrees from the Technical University system and another 43% from the university or economic academy. In 
fact, Malgorzata Fuszara decides that this group might be labeled the "old-new' middle class because it is 
composed mostly of the intelligentsia who decide to become b~sinessmen.~' Of course many of the less prominent 
businessmen do not have such aspirations or credentials. I nevertheless find the businessmen's strategy quite 
important. They seek to elevate their prestige by linking it with the intelligentsia. In these terms of educational 
background and especially forms of representation, businessmen and women are not distant from traditional 
images of the intelligentsia.62 At least businessmen and women are struggling to counteract the negative imagery 
their newfound profession might imply. 
Secondly, businessmen as playing a role akin to what Gramsci described for organic  intellectual^.^^ The 
Business Center club,@ for instance, expects its members to influence political and social matters in the country 
through their example and their argument. Indeed, we might also consider that in the construction of a market 
economy, the very site of critical intellectual activity in the articulation of the nation changes: away from the 
publication of texts and the postures of politicians,6' toward the elaboration of economic activities that are more . 
central to the nation's definition in a market economy. 
Regardless of whether Polish businessmen in general, or the ones I consider below in particular, are 
intellectual, another point deserves to be made here. Lability is more likely to be apparent in the everyday 
implementation of ideological formations. We are more likely to find intersecting structures and contradictory 
expectations, and an agency to transpose rules learned in one context to others, in the space of action rather than . 
enunciatiori. Because everyday life is less intent on preserving ideological integrity than it is in realizing ambitions 
through the use of ideologies, we are more likely to discover the conditions and ideas generating new ideological 
formations. 
In 1993, 1994 and 1995 research assistants66 and I conducted interviews with Polish managers, business 
consultants and private entrepreneurs. In initial research on this cultural encounter between Western business 
experts and Polish entrepreneurs, we argued that so called 'technical assistance' is far more than a transmission of 
expertise, and rather an attempt at profound cultural transformation in business practices. And while our experts 
might admire the courage of their entrepreneurial employers, or their 'instinct' for their market, they found little in 
the business culture of Poland from which they could learn. They might learn about the evils of communism or 
about Polish history but they wouldn't learn any technique or insight that might even be remotely associated with 
what American business scholars and students seek when they go to Japan to learn a new approach to business. 
The only business they learned was a measure of organizational responsibility that the limited sophistication of 
their enterprise allowed them to a~sume.~ '  
We asked Polish managers and entrepreneurs with whom these experts worked whether the Westerners 
were in fact mistaken. Wasn't there something Western consultants needed to learn about Polish business culture 
andlor style in order to advise more effectively. In every interview with top managers of Polish owned firms, Poles 
emphasized negative things to me about indigenous capacities, and praised certain dimensions of 'global' culture. 
Liberalism clearly provided the cultural schema with which to assess the inadequacies of the Polish nation. 
For example, most would agree that there were certain necessary concepts that Polish business simply did 
not have -- cash flow and business plans were among the most commonly identified. Each of these concepts, of 
course, emphasized a different time frame -- business plans indicating the long term, and cash flow the shorter 
term day to day survival of the firm. But both were equally necessary to the survival of the firm. Businessmen also 
emphasized that it was absolutely important to change the culture of the Polish firm, to change attitudes toward 
work and above all, to the client. One manager called this a 'new philosophy', and specifically emphasized 
dopiesczanie klienta, to do more than the client e'upects, one of the key ingredients to success, and far more 
difficult to do than 'changing the color of one's socks' (#13 1).68 Indigenous business practices, even if quite 
ingenious, simply did not build the foundations for good legal business activity. As one person recalled, 
In the beginning, there was no tradition of normal, regular Polish private business. All the 
business in Poland was, how to say it, corrupt, not in the criminal way, but corrupt in the way 
that it was not run by profit but by central planning. And ... the private business, they had to play 
by the rules as imposed by the companies' partners who were more interested in making good 
connections than making good products. (127) 
One of the most common strategies for a private firm was to work with these state companies, as one successful 
entrepreneur recalled his start. 
There was a big need for computers, but a state company couldn't buy these computers abroad. 
But the private person could buy them, and then sell it for zlotys to the state company, and then 
exchange the zlotys for dollars on the private market. It was not criminal, but it was not legal. It 
was great. (134) 
In this sense, private business was conducted in opposition to the state and its law. This legacy, recalls another 
businessman, is a problem. Socialist Poland therefore leaves Poles with no good national tradition of doing 
business. 
Up to '89, everything was controlled by the state ... which was by definition against business. So 
one thing which is very new for us and is a problem is how quickly even as a society we can 
understand that some public activities, even business activities, ... really can be assessed and can 
be judged in a social way, by public judgment (139). 
Today, however, this manager finds corruption rampant. He is disappointed with the degree to which the state has 
taken responsibility for the prosecution of that corruption. Society, thus, is being miseducated by corrupt 
capitalism. It fails to learn how to act legally, and is instead encouraged to maintain the bad practices of the past. 
It is being encouraged to hide profits, to disrespect authority and to disobey the law more generally. The liberal 
transformation, because the state is not strong enough, is making the nation sick. 
The liberals resolve the problem, however, by indicting the patient, the society. Poles are not developing a 
healthy society because they fail to elaborate the proper liberal vision. For instance, one manager recalled ivith 
regret how his employees thought of him: as a fellow Pole, rather than as their manager of a multinational firm in 
a capitalist economy. He recalled the surprise of his employees when he announced that he was closing down one 
department of the firm. I asked him, with intentional naivete, why they expected him to defend that department. 
He said, 
  he^ felt that'they, they knew me from thk past time (when he was a director thirty years earlier). 
That I was, let's say, a patriot of this company. (but) they badly understand what is pat-local 
patriotism. For me local patriotism is to earn money. For those who want to work, and not to 
defend those groups and machines which are wvorthless from the technological point of view. 
They are good for a museum. They (the employees) are too sentimental. I am not sentimental 
anymore. (952) 
I suspect that if these interviews were conducted by Poles, we would have found more positive traits of 
Polish firms identified and emphasized. But these traits would have been identified in comparison to other Polish 
firms, minimizing the American comparison. My presence and emphasis on their contact with Western 
consultants accentuated the American comparison, which in turn undervalued the Polish experience. My presence 
is not unusual, however. Western know-how is part and parcel of postcommunist liberalism, especially in terms 
of business. Lf one examines the interviews and tracts of postcommunist liberalism's leading spokesper~ons~~ the 
West almost always figures as a positive reference point, with the postcommunist country diagnosed as inadequate 
in some way. In this sense, liberalism in postcommunist capitalism at most incorporates the entrepreneurial spirit 
of a select group of leading indigenous capitalists fused with the technical sophistication of a larger world business 
culture." Indigenous business culture, the cultural soul of the postcommunist capitalist turn, is bankrupt. 
We thus find in these interviews the same kind of nationalist liberalism that we found in the more elite 
statements discussed above. The challenge of liberalism is not just to value individual rights or private property, 
but to transform the collective identity of a nation, to make it into something that it is not. At the same time, 
however, these managers display a critique of liberalism that is less commonly found in more political forums. For 
these managers, liberalism's limitations can often be found in Western presumption. But these limitations are also 
more typically found where liberalism and nationalism clash: within the multinational firm among managers who 
have regular contact with West Europeans and Americans. 
These managers consider themselves, properly, as relatively sophisticated, given their more or less 
extensive contact with Western business practices. They are not the "white socked corrupt Polish businessmen" 
who are the object of so much derision. All of them also expressed some distance from the West, however. There 
were several strategies for that distancing, but nearly all of them had one underlying comment -- that the West is at 
best naive, often insensitive, and frequently arrogant if not downright colonial in their attitude. 
The most Westernized indigenous manager I have interviewed was a marketing manager in an joint 
venture. There was nothing intrinsically wrong, she said, with the firm's culture of doing business in Eastern 
Europe. The company has its own culture which cuts across national boundaries, and the only thing wrong was 
that sometimes Westerners were too arrogant, talking behind people's backs, snickering at East Europeans as if 
they were dumb. This, she thought, was a great failing; Westerners should always demonstrate their faith that 
people can learn (957). Another manager recalled a similar event: 
We employed a Dutch company to develop a management information system for us ... after a 
couple of weeks, they took seven top people from the company for a day, which was really a 
sacrifice on our part. And we went to a meeting.. and they were explaining to us why it is 
important to have a good management information system ins'talled in the company. They were 
rewording what we told them already, showing us diagrams like inputloutput-or peoplejother 
resources/output ... l ~ k e  they were showing, oh, I don't know, undergraduates or something ... the 
consultants were predisposed ... that we were dumb, stupid and incompetent people (127) 
While this kind of consultant arrogance might exist also in the West, in Eastern Europe it is seen to be more than 
an occupational hazard. It is inevitably implicated in a question of the nation and its membership in a larger 
global culture of business accomplishment. 
Sometimes this arrogance goes beyond insensitivity, and produces a lot more hostility among managers 
than only resentment. Another manager recalled a stoty where the parent company demanded that this manager 
use his connections to fix standards for the import of some factors of production. 
Deliveries to Poland are completely signed that the product has to be delivered according to the 
Polish rules, Polish standard. And they expect that because I am a previous president (of the 
regulatory agency), I can have everything (done) like that (as he rubs his hands against each 
other, like "chip, chop"] So I told them, Why didn't you sign the contract according to the 
official standard? I am not responsible for your relation with that agency! (They tell me) Oh 
well, you have to arrange it somehow. How can I arrange it? How? There are rules, standards. 
(They say) Arrange the meeting with them. Well I arrange for the dinner with the, with the . 
president of the commission. You know him! Go ahead, arrange it with him! You know 
American oficials? You know how to fight for visa in the States? Well it's the same way with 
the Polish authorities. Apply, for example, valid documentation. Write a letter, attach the 
documentation, and wait for the approval. How can I arrange it? It's not Bangladesh or any 
other country in which you can go [slaps the table, as if slapping down a bribe)], give the 
envelope and arrange it. Maybe some envelope maybe would be helphl, but it is impossible to 
arrange these things without following proper procedures. I told them, I can maybe, maybe I can 
accelerate something. But it is impossible to avoid the necessary actions. They (the multinational 
managers) don't understand it. It's a colonial attitude. They suppose that they are in the wild 
countries, in which the, the-all the administration is corrupted totally. And, in which I have 
everywhere friends and I can arrange it in a way they don't want to, to think about. It makes me 
crazy sometimes (952) 
This arrogance not only is unseemly, but many East Europeans find that the parent company's arrogance 
and condescension actually leads them to poor business decisions. Sometimes their point is 
right out of a business textbook, in a passage familiar to anyone enjoined to 'know your customer': 
There are many potential marketing possibilities using Polish traditions, using the Polish 
mentality, using Polish culture, so if you know Polish conditions you can profit, you can really 
adapt to the needs of the people ... the needs cannot be the same because you (speaking to 
Kennedy) have a quite different experience, quite different history of your own country, so the 
needs may be the same but absolutely maybe not ... (139) 
Sometimes, however, it goes beyond knowing the desires of your customer today, beyond knowing what a focus 
group or marketing survey might yield. Sometimes it reflects directly on the past, as one manager discussed 
'employee of the month' awards: 
' 
They come up with ideas. They're happy to receive, uh, money, this reward. But when you want 
to put their name and their picture on the board and say, This guy really did something, no. 
because, it continues to be perceived as something negative really. Because you are cooperating 
with authority. Cooperation with authority'is not good by definition. Because it's been-and it's 
not only the communist 'System, it's also the, the history of Poland-you know, when it was 
partitioned for 200 years. To defy authority, to fight authority was a good patriotic deed. So now 
if you, all of a sudden, are recognized by authority, it means-well, who are you? Which side are 
you on? Even though, you know, we try to communicate and explain, you know, it's, it's pretty 
good for all of us. They are very skeptical towards it. In fact if you-I, I was just amazed myself 
-- when you try to-when you take like corporate creeds- Or mission statements. In English. 
And they make perfect sense, they're sincere and all this. You translate into Polish- It sounds 
temble. It sounds almost 100 per cent like communist propaganda (955) 
The pragmatic profit making spirit, at the heart of economic liberalism, thus can critique the global 
cultural dispositions on which it amves. At the same time, managers can ingeniously elevate the indigenous 
culture and link it to liberalism to produce a new Polish nation. They are manufacturing a new Polish nation in. 
which some popular sympathies can be sutured to the new nation, while others must be discarded. The 
fundamental principle of this new liberal nation is that knowing the nation is fundamental to good business 
practice as much as knowing liberalism. ~ n d  part of knowing the nation involves respecting it as a place filled 
with people who are.capable of learning. 
This cultural emphasis is not incompatible with the earlier liberal articulation of the nation as a pluralistic 
site of law-abiding interest formation. It does, however, incorporate a measure of cultural pride and value of 
cultural knowledge that the other did not make explicit. This valuation comes, in fact,,within liberalism's 
multinational conditions. It also can be the foundation for more aggressive turns in the nation's articulation. The 
Polish businessman might even define himself as part of the national mission: defending the nation's economic 
interests within liberalismwhile transforming the society so that the nation can survive. In fact, Poles might even . 
aspire to become the site out of which a more global postcommunist liberalism might be defined. 
Managers sometimes identified dtvergent interests between the parent firm and the indigenous company. 
One manager spoke of how a company purchased a firm in order to milk it dry ( 9 5 9 ,  and another spoke of how the 
multinational sought to undermine their capacity to be manufacturers and exporters of finished goods and turn 
them into suppliers of unfinished manufacturing goods (952). 
These critiques of Western practices were not critical of the liberal project itself. Instead, they were 
critical of the inadequacies of Westerners in a strange land, and in praise of local knowledge. In this fashion, these 
indigenous.managers could embrace the liberalism of economic transformation, urge the adaptation of Western 
models in Polish reality, and distance the Westerner him or herself as inadequate to the task of transformation. In 
this sense, the presence of Ule Westerner in Polish postcommunist capitalism indicates the inadequacy of the 
nation, but a temporary inadequacy, one that could be transcended by the creation of a new class of national heroes. 
The Polish manager is the one, by embodying both the capitalist expertise and knowledge of East European 
everyday life, that can transform these economies and societies. And at the same time, they can defend Polish 
business when need be from being ravaged by multinationals, but NOT at the expense of protecting outdated 
equipment, procedures, or practices. In this sense, they are better than nationalists or socialists, for they have the 
expertise to protect the nation's economy. But while they protect the nation's economy, they also are obliged to 
transform the nation.: 
Poles still believe that the world owes them something. That Poland is still an important 
European country, because it was one of the main causalities of the second World War for 
example. Nobody gives a damn now in the West what happened during the second World War, 
and whether Poland was important or not. Poles still think alot about national boundaries, 
national states. It's very important for them. It's such a shock to learn that people really travel 
freely, and that the West is really becoming international ... Poland is kind of a nineteenth century 
nationalist dream, probably the only one in Europe which has for no practical purpose 
minorities .... Also, I think in this whole business thing, that economies are motivated to run by 
profit-motives. It's a shock. In a way, lots of Polish attitudes, especially in the countryside, is 
kind of pre-industrialized world attitudes. Some of them are nice and are not detrimental to 
progress ... but some are just ... most Poles believe that the most important part is becoming 
agriculture. They can't understand that Poles might be better off just buying subsidized food 
from Western Euro pe... (127) 
Even as they transform their nation, Polish businessmen recognize that they have a special identity that 
they can present in the international field. Poles have long cast themselves as somehow between East and west;" 
now they can claim the same crossroads identity as transmitters of capitalist know-how, understanding better than 
Westerners the pathological past, but at the same time, understanding better than those to their East how to make 
Western know-how applicable. 
One manager recalled how they began working with lawyers from the West in Belarus. One of the 
experts advised that it was unnecessary to privatize agriculture because it was already private, believing, after all, 
that kolkhozy were private because they were coops. Americans, he said, ofien come in with theoretical knowledge 
about how supply and demand will solve problems, but East Europeans will rarely believe them. For instance, 
when shops are privatized, East Europeans believe that only vodka and cigarettes will be sold. But the Polish 
consultant can convince his Eastern neighbors by appealing to the Polish experience and how it really worked 
(13 1). 
Thus, in a global comparison, East Central European identities can acquire this positive reference in post- 
communist capitalism, but only witlun the postcommunist imagined community. When engaging the Westerner 
on "European" territory, postcommunist liberalism cannot elevate the Pole or Czech or Hungarian over the 
European. But when engaging that European on postcommunist space, by understanding the pathology of the 
nation that endured communism, the postcommunist liberal can be more effective in its transformation. 
In sum, one can find in elite liberal enunciations a clear articulation of the nation. They emphasize that 
the nation should be normal, not peculiar; it should be like the west.'* At the same time, underelaborated but 
pronounced, the nation must be transformed, ridden of its socialist maladies and inappropriate traditionalisms. . 
Polish businessmen share these ideas, but they also go beyond them. They are prepared to assume the new role of 
national hero. Their rational and sophisticated business practices might enable the nation's salvation, by being 
able to develop indigneous business competence. They can develop the real patriotism, one that knows how to 
make money for Poles. They will be in the position to distinguish between good investments and bad investments 
from abroad. And even more, they might occupy a position that elevates Poland once again to that crossroads 
identity between East and West, except this time as the interpreter for postcominunist conditions of global liberal 
visions. 
POSTCOMMUNIST BUSINESSMEN ARTICULATING THE NATION 
The businessmen whose interviews I have recalled here were not intellectuals, in the classical sense. 
Some of them were once in that position, as teachers in the university, artists or professionals in other trades. They 
all certainly had the higher education and a breadth of cultivation, Bildung, that made them a wonderful partner in 
conversations about intellectual matters far beyond the province of business. But now, their 'job' is something 
quite different. 
Now they are challenged by the new intellectual opportunity -- taking a global business culture whose 
stock of knowledge is consequential for developing a firm, and 'translating' it into a suitably indigenous practice 
appropriate to Polish business. While that certainly does not seem to be about articulating the nation, through their 
practice and example they are also instructing the nation about how they should see themselves. Sometimes it is 
quite explicit: as one editor put it to me, the mission of his publication was to teach how to look at the world 
-through the lens of money, by highlighting things useful in a market economy, from how a high flying senator 
cheated the treasury out of taxes to what elements in a building lease contract need to be there in order to be safe in 
Polish law (125). But it is certainly the case that the nation is not the primary ideological conimitment of 
businessmen. 
Unlike intellectual historians of the nation or public intellectuals articulating liberal or illiberal versions 
of the nation, or even most liberal nationalists, businessmen do not, explicitly, seek to redefine the nation. They 
certainly have their opinions, as they are Polish citizens, but their job is not to articulate them on the pages of their 
publications or in advertising for their products. They are not useful, then, for illustrating the alternative types of 
nationalisms that exist out there. Through the effect of their practices and their own articulations in everyday life 
of what the nation is and what it must be, however, they are certainly as influential if not more influential than 
those who focus on the nation per se. Their effects cany the discursive power of necessity - if economics is the 
primary basis for identity -- and of invisibility -- if they speak only practically and not ideologically. 
In their view, the Polish nation before the requisites of business is inadequate. It must be transformed by 
Western business practices. At the same time, Western business practitioners are inadequate before the Polish 
nation, but not because their general vision is hostile or their general methods inappropriate. They are inadequate 
only because they don't understand the pathology of what it was to be Polish for the last forty years. Positioning 
themselves in this fashion, postcommunist businessmen can redefine the nation -- dissect it to define its pathology, 
but at the same time, preserve it by demonstrating that they, as Poles, can do what their critique suggests they 
must. But this is a different kind of nationalism. 
This nationalism does not elevate the nation as superior. Indeed, its superiority only rests in its claim to 
be able to transcend its past, and to become something it claims as its national right: to be European. Its claim to 
superiority rests only in recognizing its pathology. But for those in East Central Europe, access to the pathology 
that was communism allows them to embrace a kind of superiority that those further to the East do not: they can 
return to the national identity as bridge between West and East, between the future and the past. And with that, the 
nation can become superior, only because of the tragedy it had to endure and now moves beyond. Nationalists don't 
like it, and liberals hardly talk about it, but liberalism, in the hands of Polish businessmen, becomes nationalism. 
It manages this best, of course, by avoiding the label. Lability. 
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